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A Brief History of the Commercial Speech




This essay is based on a paper presented at a symposium of legal
and health policy experts gathered together to discuss
implementation of the Tobacco Control Act by the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"). The target audience for this paper was
thus substantially composed of non-lawyers. What follows is a brief,
idiosyncratic, and highly opinionated summary of the evolution of the
Supreme Court's case law regarding the constitutionality under the
First Amendment of regulations of "commercial speech," tracing
developments from the origin of the commercial speech doctrine in
1976 into the modern era. I conclude with some thoughts regarding
the implications of this history for efforts (by the FDA in particular)
to regulate the advertising, marketing, and promotion of tobacco
products. The description that follows should not be taken as an
endorsement or as a critique of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence,
but merely as an interpretation of the path taken by the Court.
Similarly, the discussion of tobacco regulation that closes this article
does not endorse or attack particular regulatory proposals, but merely
seeks to predict what the judicial response to such proposals may be.
Finally, I exclude from my history the important line of commercial
speech cases dealing with regulation of advertising by professionals
such as lawyers and accountants, because of the distinct questions
raised in that context that have little relevance to tobacco regulation.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law
(bhagwata@uchastings.edu). Thanks to the organizers of the symposium "Implementing
the Tobacco Control Act: Advice to the FDA," held on August 28, 2009, at Hastings
College of the Law, including especially to the leadership of the UCSF/UC Hastings
Consortium on Law, Science, and Health Policy, and the staff of the Hastings Science &
Technology Law Journal.
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II. Virginia Pharmacy and the Definition of 'Commercial
Speech'
The Supreme Court defines commercial speech as speech that
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."' The Court
has made clear that this is an extremely narrow definition. Speech is
not commercial speech merely because it is paid for or disseminated
with a profit motive-that, after all, would cover the New York
Times. For the same reasons, not all advertising or all solicitations of
funds constitute commercial speech, as demonstrated by the political
advertisement soliciting funds that was at the center of the New York
Times v. Sullivan case,' Even a purely factual advertisement for
services can fall outside the commercial speech rubric if it contains
factual materials of a clear public interest. Admittedly, the Court has
held that an advertisement cannot avoid the commercial speech
designation simply by including discussion of, or references to,
matters of public concern.s Nonetheless, the narrowness of the
definition is critically important, because if speech does not fall within
the narrow definition of commercial speech (or within some other
unprotected category, such as obscenity6 ) it is fully protected, and any
attempt to regulate it will be subject to full, searching First
Amendment scrutiny.
Even when defined so narrowly, there is no question that
commercial speech, or commercial advertising, constitutes speech. It
is presented in the same formats as other kinds of speech, including
highly protected political speech, from which it is indistinguishable,
except in terms of content. As such, when a government enacts or
enforces rules restricting or banning commercial speech, obvious
issues arise under the First Amendment. The Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech," and the Supreme Court has held
that the First Amendment, through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, also restricts the powers of state and local
1. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Hum. Rel. Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); see
also Bigelow v. Va., 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975).
2. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
5. Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983).
6. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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governments. A law restricting or banning particular forms of
commercial advertising would seem on its face to "abridge the
freedom of speech." Nevertheless, prior to 1976, the Supreme
Court's view was that commercial speech constituted a completely
unprotected category of speech and that states had unlimited
discretion to restrict it.'
All of this changed in 1976 with the Supreme Court's decision in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council (henceforth Virginia Pharmacy).' In Virginia Pharmacy, the
Court unambiguously held that commercial speech did not sit
completely outside of First Amendment protection, rejecting earlier
decisions holding to the contrary.'o In reaching this conclusion, the
Court emphasized the value of commercial information to both
consumers and the functioning of the free market. It also,
importantly, introduced a strong anti-paternalistic element into
commercial speech law, arguing that the First Amendment required
states to trust the ability of consumers to make good use of truthful,
non-misleading commercial information." By imposing substantial
constraints on the power of government to suppress or limit
commercial speech, the Court's emphasis on the social value of
commercial advertising and hostility toward paternalistic regulations
opened a new era in the constitutional treatment of commercial
speech regulations.
This is not to say that the Virginia Pharmacy Court treated
commercial speech as indistinguishable from or entitled to the same
level of protection as, say, political speech. To the contrary, Virginia
Pharmacy recognizes important limitations to the protection of
commercial speech, in effect creating exceptions to the constitutional
protection the Court announced. Among the most important of these
exceptions are:
7. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); see also Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1951).
9. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
10. Id. at 761 70.
11. Id. at 770 ("There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.
That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them.").
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1. False or misleading commercial speech receives no
constitutional protection;12
2. Commercial speech about illegal transactions receives
no protection;
3. Advertising through electronic media (meaning, in
1976, broadcast television and radio) may receive lower
*14protection;4
4. Disclosure and warning requirements, as well as
regulation of the form of advertising, may be more
permissible in the commercial speech arena than
elsewhere; 5 and,
5. The prior restraint doctrine may not apply to
commercial speech regulations."
In combination, these restrictions clearly grant the government
far greater discretion to regulate commercial speech than other, fully
protected forms of speech such as political speech. At the same time,
however, they in no way undermine the basic message of Virginia
Pharmacy that commercial speech has social value and cannot be
fully suppressed merely because of the government's paternalistic
concerns that consumers will misuse information.
III. Central Hudson, the 1980s, and the 'Vice' Exception
After Virginia Pharmacy, the next critical step in the evolution of
the Court's commercial speech jurisprudence was its decision in
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New York in
1980.17 In Central Hudson, the Court announced a four-part test for
commercial speech regulations, which it described as follows:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
12. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
13. Id. at 772.
14. Id. at 773.
15. Id. at 772 n.24.
16. Id.
17. Central Hudson Gas. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest."' 8
This test establishes an "intermediate" level of scrutiny for
commercial speech regulations, less protective than strict scrutiny, but
with some teeth nonetheless. The Central Hudson Court employed
its new test to strike down a New York rule forbidding utilities from
engaging in promotional advertising to encourage electricity
consumption.
Despite this protective language, however, Central Hudson
seemed to back away from some of the premises of Virginia
Pharmacy, reducing the level of protection accorded to commercial
speech. In particular, Central Hudson appeared to reject Virginia
Pharmacy's strong anti-paternalism principle, because the Central
Hudson majority accepted the possibility that a properly tailored
regulation could suppress advertising for the sole purpose of shielding
consumers from information as a means of discouraging consumption.
Justice Blackmun, the author of Virginia Pharmacy, refused to join
the majority opinion for precisely this reason."
The decision in Central Hudson introduced a period of greater
toleration for regulations of commercial speech. There were two key
developments during this era exemplifying this greater tolerance.
One was the Court's decision in Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox20 (henceforth SUNY v. Fox), in which
the Court held that the fourth element of the Central Hudson test,
that a regulation be "not more extensive than is necessary to serve
[the government's] interest," did not require the government to use
the least speech-restrictive means possible; it only required a
"reasonable" fit between the regulation and the government's goals.21
The Court also confirmed that the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine did not apply to commercial speech."2 The SUNY v. Fox
decision thus established (or perhaps confirmed) that the Central
Hudson test granted governments substantial discretion in regulating
commercial speech, so long as they had strong reasons for doing so.
The second key development in the post-Central Hudson era was
the Court's decision in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
18. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
19. Id. at 573 79 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
20. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
21. Id. at 480.
22. Id. at 481.
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Co. of Puerto Rico." In Posadas, the Court upheld a ban imposed by
the government of Puerto Rico on casino advertising directed at
residents of Puerto Rico, despite the fact that casino gambling was
legal in Puerto Rico. The Court held that the ban was a reasonable
and legitimate means for Puerto Rico to reduce demand for gambling
among its citizens-a flat rejection of the anti-paternalism principles
announced in Virginia Pharmacy.2 In a crucial passage supporting its
result, the Court stated that Puerto Rico's ban was justified because
"the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily
includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling."2 In
combination, these two aspects of the Posadas decision appeared not
only to spell the end of the anti-paternalism principle, but also to
create a "vice" exception to the commercial speech doctrine, under
which governments would appear to enjoy essentially unlimited
power to ban or restrict advertising for products that are themselves
widely subjected to restrictions or bans.
IV. The Revival of the Commercial Speech Doctrine
As a consequence of the Central Hudson, Posadas, and SUNY v.
Fox decisions, by the end of the 1980s the commercial speech doctrine
appeared to have retreated greatly from the strong promise of the
Virginia Pharmacy decision. But in the mid-1990s, the Court took a
surprising turn, substantially reviving the doctrine, to a point perhaps
even beyond the rhetoric of Virginia Pharmacy. The first inkling of
this development was the Court's 1993 decision in City of Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, in which the Court struck down Cincinnati's
decision to revoke a company's permit to place news racks on public
property (the City revoked the permit because the materials
distributed by the company were primarily advertising; news racks
distributing newspapers were still permitted)." The key decision,
however, occurred in 1995 in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.2' Here, the
Court unanimously struck down a federal statute prohibiting beer
companies from displaying alcohol content on beer labels. In
applying the Central Hudson test, the Court placed the burden of
proof on the government and applied the fourth prong of the test in a
23. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986).
24. Id. at 341-42.
25. Id. at 345-46.
26. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
27. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co, 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
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very aggressive fashion, suggesting that the existence of less
restrictive alternatives doomed the regulation, all without even
mentioning SUNY v. Fox.2 Moreover, in a concurring opinion Justice
Stevens argued that Central Hudson was not applicable to this
situation because in this case the government was not trying to
protect consumers from false, misleading, or incomplete commercial
speech. This concurrence seems to suggest that prohibitions on
truthful, non-misleading speech were simply impermissible. The
commercial speech doctrine had returned.
In the years since Rubin, the Court has issued a series of broad
decisions invalidating commercial speech restrictions in a number of
areas. Prominent examples include:
1. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,2 9 in which the Court
invalidated a Rhode Island statute banning the advertising
of alcoholic beverage prices. Although the Court splintered
heavily in this case, producing no majority opinion, all nine
justices concurred in the result and all (including Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the author of Posadas) joined opinions
distancing the Court from the reasoning of Posadas.
2. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States,"o
in which the Court struck down a federal law banning
advertising by commercial casinos on radio and television
broadcast stations, as applied in states where casinos were
legal. Again, the Court was unanimous as to the result.
3. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly," in which the Court struck
down a series of regulations adopted by the State of
Massachusetts restricting outdoor advertising of tobacco
products (as well as certain point-of-sale advertisements).
Massachusetts defended the restrictions as designed to
shield children from tobacco advertising, an interest that the
Court deemed important, but the Court held that the broad
Massachusetts regulations excessively limited the ability of
tobacco companies to advertise to adult customers.
4. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center," in which the
Court struck down a federal statute that allowed a pharmacy
28. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490-91.
29. 44 Liquormart v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
30. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
31. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
32. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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to sell "compounded drugs" (drugs mixed-to-order for
customers, which have not undergone the standard
regulatory approval process) only if the pharmacy did not
advertise these products.
Examining these cases as a group, several important lessons
emerge. First and foremost, the cases clearly demonstrate that the
Court has completely abandoned the Posadas "vice" exception; all
but one of the cases (Thompson) involved "vice" products, but that in
no way reduced the Court's scrutiny. Second, the cases demonstrate
an important revival of the anti-paternalism principle. In 44
Liquormart, several of the Justices joined opinions asserting that
when the government regulates commercial speech not to protect
consumers from being mislead, but rather simply to shield them from
truthful, non-misleading information for fear that it would be
convincing, full First Amendment scrutiny should apply, rather than
the relaxed Central Hudson test." And in the Thompson case, a
majority of the Court explicitly adopted an anti-paternalism rationale
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy) to reject the government's argument
that a ban on compounded drug advertising was necessary to prevent
consumers from demanding such drugs when they are not needed.34
Third, the cases, especially Thompson, show that the commercial
speech doctrine applies with full force even when the advertised
product is subject to expansive direct regulation. Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, the cases demonstrate an abandonment of SUNY
v. Fox and a substantial tightening of the narrow tailoring
requirement of Central Hudson's fourth prong. The Court seemed to
acknowledge this development in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting,
Lorillard, and Thompson;" and in any event the results in these cases
speak for themselves. Taken together, these cases herald an
extraordinary revival of the commercial speech doctrine, to a point
where, at least with respect to truthful, non-misleading advertising, it
may be doubted whether such speech truly does receive less
constitutional protection than other forms of speech.
33. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501-44 (plurality opinion); id. at 517 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 518-27 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
34. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 374-75.
35. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., 527 U.S. at 184; Lorillard, 533 U.S. at
554-55; Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368.
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The cases also hint at the direction in which the Court's
commercial speech jurisprudence may evolve in the coming years.
Most significantly, there are serious doubts about the long-term
viability of Central Hudson, at least as an across-the-board test for
commercial speech regulations. As noted above, in 44 Liquormart a
number of justices joined opinions suggesting that government
regulation of truthful, non-misleading commercial speech may
deserve a higher level of protection, perhaps even full First
Amendment protection. This would entail strict scrutiny for content-
based restrictions of non-misleading commercial speech, resulting in
an upholding of the law only if it is narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling governmental interest-a standard that is generally fatal.
Of course, the addition of Justices Alito and Sotomayor and Chief
Justice Roberts to the Court in recent years adds some uncertainty
about where the Court now stands, but in fact the Justices they
replaced (Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Souter) were among the
strongest adherents to the Central Hudson test; if anything, support
for the test may be weaker now than in the past and the heightened
version of Central Hudson employed in more recent years may soon
be replaced by an even more stringent standard.
The potential demise of the intermediate scrutiny aspect of
Central Hudson also raises questions about the viability of the
exceptions to commercial speech protection identified in Virginia
Pharmacy. In particular, if commercial speech is treated as fully
protected, the inapplicability of the prior restraint doctrine, as well as
the lesser protection accorded to electronic advertising, might be
brought into question. With respect to electronic advertising in
particular, the possibility of a major change in this area was brought
to the fore in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in the recent FCC
v. Fox Television Stations decision. Here, Thomas argued (in a
context not involving commercial speech) for the abandonment of the
traditionally deferential approach taken by the Court regarding
regulation of the broadcast medium." If the Court does move in this
direction, it may do so for commercial speech as well as other speech.
On the other hand, at least for now there seems to be no movement
towards questioning Virginia Pharmacy's conclusions that false and
misleading commercial speech and advertising of illegal transactions
remain unprotected. Regulators can probably remain confident that
restrictions on those sorts of commercial speech will continue to be
36. 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819-22 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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upheld, even though similar restrictions of, for example, political
speech would surely be struck down."
V. Some Thoughts About Tobacco Regulation
I conclude by considering some of the implications of the above
history and predictions for some of the proposals made by conference
speakers to regulate the marketing and advertising of tobacco
products. By no means can I discuss every proposal advanced, so I
focus on the proposals that in my view raise the most serious First
Amendment concerns.
A key preliminary point to recognize is that smoking remains
legal for adults in this country. That fact, combined with the demise
of the "vice" exception, means that tobacco advertising regulations
will receive the same scrutiny as any other commercial speech
regulations. Moreover, the rebirth of the anti-paternalism principle
means that restrictions on tobacco advertising cannot be justified as a
way to prevent adults from smoking. On the other hand, the sale of
tobacco products to minors is illegal, and so tobacco advertising
targeted at minors remains unprotected. However, Lorillard makes
clear that even regulations designed to shield children from tobacco
advertising will not be upheld if they restrict too much advertising
directed at adults.
A. Restrictions on the Depiction of Smoking in Movies
Due to the positive image of smoking conveyed by many movies,
a number of recent proposals have called for restriction of this
imagery. To begin with, the simple cinematic depiction of smoking is
not commercial speech, even if a particular brand of cigarette is
highlighted, because the purpose of such a depiction is not to merely
sell a product. As such, any effort to flatly ban the depiction of
smoking in movies would be subject to strict scrutiny, and would
surely be struck down as vastly overbroad. A ban on the depiction of
smoking in movies targeted at minors, however, raises a more difficult
question. Such a ban would still be subject to strict scrutiny, but the
Court may well recognize protecting children from smoking to be a
compelling governmental interest. A flat ban on smoking in all
movies targeted at minors is probably still overbroad, because so
many movies targeted at teenagers also have very significant adult
37. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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audiences (indeed, there is no clear division between "teenage" and
"adult" movies). A narrower ban for movies targeted at young
children-say, children's cartoons-might be upheld, but because
smoking is rarely depicted in such movies the benefit of such a
proposal is doubtful.
A more complicated question arises if the regulation is directed
at paid product placement of tobacco products in movies. Such
product placement might well be treated as commercial speech, even
if the movie as a whole is not. On the other hand, it will be difficult to
argue that such placement is false or misleading; as a result, a flat ban
on product placement in movies again is probably overbroad. Under
current law, a narrower ban on product placement in movies where
the primary audience consists of minors (such as the Harry Potter
movies, say, as well as cartoons) might survive constitutional scrutiny.
B. Regulation of the Internet and Social Media
Proposals have also been advanced to ban or severely restrict
tobacco companies' marketing of products through online social
networks and interactive websites. A flat ban or severe restrictions
on such marketing would not survive the Central Hudson test, much
less strict scrutiny, given that this would close an entire medium of
communication and eliminate enormous amounts of protected
speech. It may be that a narrower ban, forbidding certain forms of
marketing particularly likely to be attractive to minors, such as online
games, might be permissible. As with movies, however, drafting such
regulation poses a challenge because of the large overlap between the
sorts of things that attract minors, and those that attract young adults
aged 18 and over (to whom advertising is fully protected). If too
much marketing to adults is swept in, the Lorillard decision suggests
that the regulation will be struck down.
C. Prohibitions on Sponsorship of Sporting and Cultural Events
Another area of potential regulation concerns the broad banning
of tobacco companies' name brand sponsorship of sporting and
cultural events. Compared to the restrictions concerning movies and
the Internet discussed above, this is a narrower prohibition, which
suggests that it may survive First Amendment scrutiny. Again,
however, there are reasons to be cautious. Of course, it would almost
certainly be permissible to ban sponsorship of events where the
primary audience is minors (e.g., Disney on Ice), but such
sponsorships are hardly common. Other athletic and cultural events
are not primarily targeted at children, and so following the reasoning
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of Lorillard a reviewing court might well conclude that such a
restriction is overbroad because it suppresses too much protected
speech. A better, more tailored solution may be to ban only
sponsorships of those events where minors are an unusually large
percentage of the audience.
D. Premarket Testing of Advertising to Assure Lack of Appeal to
Children
Finally, proposals have been advanced to require tobacco
companies to permit a government agency (presumably the FDA) to
pre-screen proposed advertisements to ensure that they are not
especially likely to appeal to children. Under current law, this
proposal is probably permissible. Tobacco advertising directed at
children is probably unprotected speech, because the sale of tobacco
to minors is illegal (I add the caveat probably because unlike an
advertisement to sell heroin, which is clearly unprotected, there is no
clear line between tobacco advertisements directed at children, which
are unprotected, and advertisements directed at adults, which are
not). Furthermore, it remains the case today that the prior restraint
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech, and so a prescreening
system is permissible, even though in most other contexts licensing of
speech would most likely be invalidated." The only caveat that is
necessary here is that if the Court does abandon Central Hudson in
the near future, it may also question some of the Virginia Pharmacy
exceptions, including the prior restraint exception. If the Court did
so, a prescreening requirement would be invalid as a classic prior
restraint.
VI. Conclusion
The commercial speech doctrine has taken a long, twisted path
since its birth in the Virginia Pharmacy decision. Today, however, the
doctrine appears to be as potent as at any time in its history. Indeed,
there is a significant chance that at least with respect to truthful, non-
misleading commercial speech, the doctrine may be in the process of
merging with the Supreme Court's general Free Speech
jurisprudence.
That said, regulators do retain some authority to regulate
tobacco advertising. For one thing, any false or misleading
38. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (holding unconstitutional a municipal
ordinance that required written permission to distribute printed materials of any kind).
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advertising, such as that which raises doubts about the health risks of
smoking, for example, can clearly be prohibited. In addition,
advertising clearly targeted at minors can be prohibited, because
advertising of illegal transactions (such as the sale of tobacco to
minors) remains unprotected. As long as tobacco products remain
legal, however, regulators do not have the authority to shield adults
from tobacco advertising simply to prevent smoking. And even with
respect to regulations designed to protect minors, if the burden
imposed on advertising to adults is too great, these regulations will
likely be invalidated.
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